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Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences,
Secret Liens and Floating Liens
C. Roberi Morris, Jr.*
Students in my bankruptcy course do not readily under-
stand the status of unperfected transfers in bankruptcy. Until
it is spelled out for them, they do not understand that a mort-
gage given at the time of the secured debt and which would not
be a preference if seasonably recorded becomes a preference if
it is withheld from record or is recorded too late and less than
four months before the mortgagor's petition in bankruptcy.
I have always enjoyed teaching this subject because here was
clearly a teaching task which I could accomplish. I could show
them how, under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,' such a
transaction is voidable as a preference.
I have come to the conclusion, however, that my students'
initial intuition is correct. The law is wrong. Such a transaction
is not factually a preference and the law of preferences is not
the appropriate vehicle for handling secret liens in bankruptcy.
The fiction whereby section 60 transforms secret liens into pref-
erences has long been a source of mischief. This mischief could
be abated by a new provision directed at the avoidance of se-
cret transfers and by the rewriting of section 60 so that it gov-
erns only preferences in fact. Finally, a further change in the
law of preferences would solve some of the problems that arise
in trying to distinguish routine transactions from preferences
and would put to rest a number of problems, including the
status of floating liens in bankruptcy. Before proposing amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act, however, this article will discuss
true preferences and the reason for their avoidance, relate how
the preference provision was expanded to include unperfected
transfers, and review some of the problems that have resulted
from confusing unperfected transfers with preferences.
I. HISTORY AND SUBSTANCE OF APPLICABLE
BANKRUPTCY LAW PROVISIONS
A. TRUE PREFERENCES AND THE RATIONALE FOR THEm AVOIDANCE
It is said that section 60 voids some preferences made by the
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as AcT, with section references from the Statutes atLarge, rather than the U.S.C.].
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bankrupt in the four month period prior to bankruptcy because
"the theme of the Bankruptcy Act is equality of distribution."2
Any observer must admit, however, that the theme of equality
is undermined by liens and priorities. Secured creditors are paid
to the extent of their security, provided their security can with-
stand the onslaughts of the trustee's avoidance powers. Any-
thing left over is used first to pay the costs of administration
and then to pay in order four different classes of creditors with
statutory priorities.3 Usually nothing remains for the general
creditors. Sometimes there is a pittance.
Nevertheless, the orchestration of the various themes of the
Bankruptcy Act must be respected. A particular pattern of dis-
tribution has been ordained, and a failing debtor should not be
permitted to subvert this pattern by making disbursements on
the eve of bankruptcy. Thus, should the debtor allocate his
dwindling resources among some of his creditors to the disad-
vantage of his other creditors, these assets may in certain cir-
cumstances be recaptured by the trustee in bankruptcy and
reallocated according to the established pattern of distribution.
One can wonder whether it is worth all the trouble, since often
the reclaimed preference will be used merely to pay creditors
who enjoy a statutory priority. Taking from Preferred Peter
to pay Priority Paul does not smack of the equality which is
equity.
Some of the equities in favor of leaving matters untouched
are recognized by section 60. After all., the parties to a prefer-
ence have usually done nothing dishonorable. The debtor paid
a debt; the creditor accepted his due. An attempt to undo all
such transactions of the previous four months would give bank-
ruptcy courts more funds to allocate according to the ordained
pattern, but it would be a mammoth task. Recovering all of
the routine payments made during insolvency and the preced-
ing four month period merely to reallocate these funds between
the original recipients and the bankrupt's other creditors would
simply not be worth the cost. Section 60 (b) therefore permits
avoidance of preferences only if the recipient, at the time of the
payment, has "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
insolvent." Thus, the great mass of preferences are not voided.
The innocent creditor who accepts what appears to be a routine
payment will normally be permitted to keep it.
2. 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1969), and
cases cited therein.
3. AcT, supra note 1, § 64(a).
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The bad preference, the one which bankruptcy administra-
tion has sought to void, is one which involves some element of
culpability. The elements of this malefaction have never been
clearly defined. A debtor's attempt to distribute his estate
among his creditors according to a plan different from that re-
quired in bankruptcy, with an eye to going into bankruptcy
later, was considered by Lord Mansfield to be a fraudulent trans-
fer. He did not, however, condemn payments in the ordinary
course of business, even though on the eve of bankruptcy. 4 The
key question therefore was whether the debtor intended to sub-
stitute his own pattern of distribution for that of bankruptcy.
The early American bankruptcy acts did not materially depart
from this English view; but the courts found it difficult to dis-
tinguish intentional preferences from payments in the ordinary
course of business because they gave credence to the ancient dic-
tum that every man intends the probable consequences of his
own acts. Thus, routine payments by an insolvent were deemed
voidable preferences.5
The Act of 1898, rather than focusing on the debtor's actual
or presumed intent, considered the matter from the creditor's
viewpoint. In an avoidance proceeding, the trustee had to prove
that the preferred creditor "had reasonable cause to believe that
it was intended to give a preference .... ,,1 This language has
since been amended twice. A 1910 amendment completely re-
moved the debtor's intent from the determination, and instead
established as the test whether the creditor had reasonable cause
to believe that the transfer "would effect a preference." Under
this test, preferences were voidable only if the creditor had
cause to believe that bankruptcy was imminent. In 1938, the
Chandler Act deleted any implied reference to the creditor's ex-
pectation of bankruptcy,8 so that today all that must be proved
is that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor
was insolvent.
These changes seem to have been dictated by problems of
proof. Although a guilty intent is practically impossible to
prove, the presumption that the actor intends the probable con-
sequences of his act assured a finding that the transaction was
4. Alderson v. Temple, 4 Borrow 2235, 98 Eng. Rep. 165 (K.B.
1768).
5. 3 W. COLLim, supra note 2, 60.05[1].
6. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 562.
7. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 11, 36 Stat. 842.
8. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 60, 52 Stat. 870.
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a preference. This presumption was eliminated by the 1898 ver-
sion which stated the issue in terms of the creditor's state of
mind. This test went too far, however, and the subsequent
amendments were attempts to reduce the trustee's burden by
framing an issue more susceptible of proof. The present test
is not stated in terms of culpability, but it does include culpable
creditors-those who are privy to the debtor's plan to super-
sede the bankruptcy scheme of distribution. There is, how-
ever, a bit of overkill in it. Some creditors who accept un-
solicited payments from a debtor known to be insolvent will
suffer. In practice, there is also some underkill in it. Some
creditors may secretly connive with their debtors to defeat the
bankruptcy scheme of distribution; if the secret is well kept, the
trustee will not be able to prove that the creditor had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. Nevertheless,
the test does protect many creditors who receive routine pay-
ments on the eve of bankruptcy, while reaching many who con-
nive with their debtors.
B. EXPANSION OF THE PREFERENCE PROVISION TO INCLUDE
UNPERFECTED TRANSFERS
As considered thus far, the law of preferences has little to
do with the law of secured transactions. Of course, a preference
can be made by way of a lien, just as it can be made by way of
a transfer of complete title. If a debtor gives his creditor a lien
to secure an antecedent debt under circumstances in which pay-
ment of the debt would give rise to a voidable preference, then
that lien will also be voidable as a preference. As originally en-
acted in 1898, section 60 went no further. Voidable preferences
were voidable without regard to the form of transfer, and non-
preferential transactions were not within the reach of the sec-
tion. Subsequent amendments, however, have extended the pro-
vision of section 60 to condemn certain unrecorded transactions
regardless of whether they were, in fact, preferences. These
amendments were part of Congress' attack on secret liens.
As enacted in 1898, the Bankruptcy Act appeared to con-
demn secret liens, but its provisions proved inadequate to ac-
complish such a task. Congress had seen only part of the prob-
lem and the sections which dealt with that part were poorly
drafted. The main source of the trustee's title was then, as it is
now, section 70(a) (5) which made him the bankrupt's suc-
cessor, with title to the bankrupt's assets subject to all the liens
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and encumbrances which had attached before bankruptcy.9 Sec-
tion 67 (a), however, provided that "[c] laims which for want of
record... would not have been valid liens as against the claims
of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his
estate."'1  Congress had not had sufficient experience with the
secret lien problem to realize the two shortcomings of this pro-
vision. First, unrecorded liens would be "valid liens as against
the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt" if the particular
recording act gave no protection to general creditors but pro-
tected instead only those creditors who had obtained a judicial
lien. Second, recorded liens might be just as pernicious as un-
recorded ones if they had been withheld from record until
shortly before bankruptcy. A belatedly recorded lien would
surprise those who had extended credit. If bankruptcy quickly
ensued, they would be injured as much as if an unrecorded lien
had been honored in bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the preference provisions of the 1898 act ag-
grevated the problem of the belatedly recorded lien. Then, as
now, preferences were both an act of bankruptcy under section
3(a) and voidable under section 60. And, as is still true, in-
voluntary petitions in bankruptcy had to be filed within four
months of the alleged act of bankruptcy. To deal with the dan-
ger that preferences might be withheld from record, section 3 (b)
provided that the period for filing an involuntary petition would
not expire "until four months after ... the date of recording or
registering is required or permitted . . . ."11 However, section
9. The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall ... be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of
the date [of bankruptcy] . . . to all ... property which prior to
the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred
or which might have been levied upon and sold under ju-
dicial process against him ....
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §70(a) (5), 30 Stat. 564-65 (codified as
AcT, supra note 1, § 70 (a) (5)). Language in the bracketed phrase and
that omitted has been changed over the years by various amendments.
The above quoted language, which contains the major substance of the
subsection, has, however, remained the same since enactment.
Some cases have given the trustee better title than the bankrupt
had in spite of the apparent limitation of his title to that of the bankrupt
as of the date of bankruptcy. See 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 2,I70.48[l].
10. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67 (a), 30 Stat. 564. Section 67 (d)
stated the converse of this proposition: "Liens given or accepted in good
faith and not in contemplation of or in fraud upon this Act, and for a
present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if
record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall not be
affected by this act."
11. Id. § 3(a), 30 Stat. at 546. The section continued:
1970]
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60, which avoided preferences made within four months of bank-
ruptcy, had no such provision. Thus a preferential transfer
could be secretly made and withheld from record for at least
four months. Upon recording it would. be an act of bankruptcy
but it would be too old to be voidable. The statute, therefore,
encouraged the belated recording of preferential transactions.
In 1903, Congress attempted to remedy this matter. The
House of Representatives added the above quoted language of
section 3(b) to section 60.12 The Senate, however, deleted the
words "or permitted . ... " The legislative history gives no
hint of the reason for the deletion.13 As finally enacted, the
amendment added a sentence to the end of section 60(a):
"Where the preference consists in a trwasfer, such period of four
months shall not expire until four months after the date of the
recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording
or registering is required."' 4 Contemporary legislative materials
make it clear that Congress was only attempting to make void-
able actual preferences which were also acts of bankruptcy.
There is no evidence that Congress intended to make voidable
unrecorded transfers which were not preferential in fact.' 5 Con-
or, if [recording is not required or permitted], from the date
when the beneficiary takes notorious, exclusive, or continuouspossession of the property unless the petitioning creditors have
received actual notice of such transfer or assignment.
12. 35 CONG. REC. 6938 (1902). The proposed amendment included
the language quoted in note 11 supra.
13. 36 CON. REC. 1036 (1903). The language quoted in note 11
supra, was also deleted. This change was recommended by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, but the Committee made no written report and
no reasons were advanced on the Senate floor.
14. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 799-800.
15. The House Judiciary Committee, in its analysis of the bill,
stated:
Section 60 ... is amended ... by adding . . . a clause which
shall be equivalent to that found in section 3b(1). It seems
that as section 60 ... now stands, a preferential mortgage may
be given, and the creditor preferred by withholding it from rec-
ord four months be able [sic] to dismiss the trustee's suit to
recover the same, though the paper was actually recorded
within the four months' period. (See [I]n re Wright (Ga.),
96 Fed. 187; [fln re Mersman (N.Y.), 7 Am. B.R., 46.)
H.R. REP. No. 1698, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1902).
There is some subsequent evidence to the contrary. The propo-
nents of the 1910 amendment to section 60 introduced their report by
saying, "The object of this amendment is further to protect against the
evil of secret liens, against which evils this same section was amended
in 1903, but in such an unfortunate way as not effectually to prevent
such liens." H.R. REP. No. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1910); see also
S. REP. No. 691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). See further quotations from
these same reports in the text accompanying note 31 infra. It seems
[Vol. 54:737
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gress appeared unaware of the problems arising from nonprefer-
ential liens which were kept secret by withholding them from
record.
In actual bankruptcy administration, however, the secret
lien problem was obvious. Trustees relied on section 67(a) to
avoid liens never recorded and turned to the 1903 amendment
to avoid liens kept secret for a time but recorded within four
months of bankruptcy. Their leading case was First National
Bank v. Connett.16 There, an insolvent debtor gave his bank a
mortgage to secure an antecedent debt, thereby effecting a pref-
erence. The bank, however, had no reason to know of his in-
solvency at the time. Ten months later, when the bank learned
that the debtor was insolvent and planning to wind up his af-
fairs, it recorded the mortgage. Bankruptcy ensued a month
later. Though the mortgage was a preference in fact, before the
1903 amendment it would clearly have been too stale at the time
of bankruptcy. The bank contended that even after the amend-
ment, the transaction was too stale because recordation was not
"required" but was merely permissible under local law. The
court commented that such a holding would make the amend-
ment a nullity and held that unrecorded mortgages were void
to such a wide variety of persons that, as a matter of Missouri
law, the transaction was not accomplished until the date of re-
cordation.17 The bank also defended on the ground that at
the time of the transaction it had no reason to believe a prefer-
ence was intended. But the court answered that the bank did
have reason to so believe at the date of recording, which was
the crucial date. The court stated:
While the situation is somewhat anomalous, we believe it is
within the spirit of the amended act, and that the voidable
element is established by the knowledge of the bank when its
likely that these statements were merely attempts to sweeten the pill of
the 1910 amendment and that they do not reflect any legislative intent
behind the 1903 amendment.
16. 142 F. 33 (8th Cir. 1905).
17. Id. at 36. On this issue, the court expressly refused to follow
the Fifth Circuit, which had ruled against the trustee in Meyer Bros.
Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co., 136 F. 396 (5th Cir. 1905). In that case the
court, observing that the Texas recording act did not void unrecorded
chattel mortgages as between the parties, held that recording was not
"required" within the meaning of the 1903 amendment. Though this
holding might have given meaning to the Senate's deletion of any refer-
ence to permissive recordation, it deprived the 1903 statute of all meaning,
since most recording acts leave unrecorded transfers effective between
the parties.
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mortgages were recorded that the mortgagor was insolvent and
contemplated a disposition of his property.' 8
Trustees whose estates were burdened with secret liens used
the theory of the Connett case to attack such liens even when
they were not originally granted as preferences. For instance,
In Re Reynolds 9 involved an unrecorded mortgage given for a
contemporaneous loan. The mortgagee, however, went into pos-
session 10 months later. There was no evidence that the debtor
had been insolvent at the time of the mortgage, but his insol-
vency was manifest at the time the mortgagee took possession.
In spite of the fact that the mortgage was not given to secure
an antecedent debt and thereby to prefer a general creditor, the
court held it to be a voidable preference.
[T]he amendment of 1903 was intended to remedy the evil re-
sulting from secret instruments of transfer of the bankrupt's
property, the withholding them from record until shortly before
the institution of bankruptcy proceedings, and the then [sic]
assertion of them as of the prior date of their execution and
delivery. And this was accomplished by making the rights of
a creditor thus favored determinable by the conditions existing
when he caused the transfer to him to be [perfected] rather
than by those existing at the time he secured it.20
By the time of perfection, the debt was an antecedent debt. Thus,
by fictitiously postdating the security, the court converted a
contemporaneous transaction into a preference.21
This fiction, however, was not accepted by some courts. In
Claridge v. Evans,22 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused
to avoid a mortgage to secure future advances which, through
a lawyer's oversight, was not recorded for two years, even
though the mortgagee knew the debtor was insolvent at the
18. 142 F. at 37.
19. 153 F. 295 (W.D. Ark. 1907).
20. Id. at 300.
21. The fictitious aspect of this theory was not recognized by some
of the courts at the time:
There can be no question as to these conveyances working a
preference .... The defendant.., got $6,000 of security from
the bankrupt, as against $7,000 of indebtedness . . . ; whereas,
to pay other creditors, by whom claims have been proved to the
extent of over $42,000, there are per:aaps $2,000 or $3,000 of
available assets in sight.
English v. Ross, 140 F. 630, 632 (M.D. Pa. 1905) (mortgages to secure
future advances not recorded until after the loans had been advanced).
Of course, this would have been true had the mortgages been timely
recorded. A secured creditor's position is preferable (in the sense of
"nicer"), but he does not thereby enjoy a preference in the bankruptcy
sense.
22. 137 Wis. 218, 118 N.W. 198 (1908).
[Vol. 54:737
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time of the mortgage and at all times thereafter. The court
stated:
The fundamental difficulty with the trustee's contention is that
the sections deal with preferences alone, not with all business
transactions, and the giving of a mortgage or other security to
secure prepayment of a present loan, or a loan to-be made in
the future, is not a preference. In order to constitute a prefer-
ence there must be an existing antecedent debt, upon which a
payment is made, or for which security is given. ... The very
word "preference" means that one person is favored above
others, who, before the favor was shown, stood on an equal
footing.... [P]robably there would have been no attack on the
mortgage were it not for the concluding clause of section 60a,
which, in effect, declares that if the local law requires the re-
cording of the transfer, the four-month period during which
preferences are inhibited shall not expire until four months
after the date of the recording. But this clause does not define
a preference, nor purport to make a preference out of a transac-
tion which was not a preference before. It only applies where
the transfer itself constitutes a preference .... 23
Meanwhile, the trustees' attacks upon liens never recorded
met serious obstacles. They had relied upon section 67(a),
which voided all liens which were invalid against any creditor
of the bankrupt for want of record.24  They had also con-
structed some ingenious arguments based on other parts of the
act.25 The trustees enjoyed some success, but in York Manu-
facturing Company v. CasseU12 6 they suffered a serious defeat.
The Supreme Court upheld an unrecorded conditional sale be-
cause the Ohio recording act protected only creditors who ac-
quired a judicial lien on the encumbered property, and none of
the creditors whom the trustee represented had acquired such a
lien. Since many recording acts are similarly limited and since
most bankruptcies involve only creditors without such liens, the
trustees' power to avoid secret liens which were never recorded
was severely limited by the decision.
In 1910, Congress enacted two amendments in an attempt
to solve the secret lien problem. From the report of the House
23. Id. at 224-27, 118 N.W. at 200-01.
24. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
25. Relying upon section 70 (a) (5), which gives the trustee title to
property the bankrupt could have sold or which could have been levied
on by his creditors, the trustees argued that they had the title such
purchasers or levying creditors would have. A number of lower courts
ruled in their favor and the Supreme Court tended that way in Security
Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907) (undelivered pledge) and
in Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.S. 545 (1910) (unrecorded
chattel mortgage).
26. 201 U.S. 344 (1906). This case was not overruled by the
later cases cited in note 25 supra.
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Judiciary Committee,27 it seems clear that the draftsmen of
these amendments recognized that there was only a single prob-
lem-the problem of secret liens. Eowever, there were two
holdings which had to be overruled: the York Manufacturing
case which preserved unrecorded liens and the Claridge line of
cases which upheld liens recorded shortly before bankruptcy.
The amendments, therefore, adopted a two-fold approach to se-
cret liens.2
8
York Manufacturing was negated by the "strong arm"
clause which gave the trustee the powers of a levying creditor.29
This was responsive to the theory of York, which had held that
the trustee could avoid certain unrecorded liens only if he rep-
resented an actual levying creditor who himself had rights su-
perior to the lien under local law. The amendment gave the
trustee the powers of such a creditor in all cases, whether or
not such a creditor actually existed.
The other amendment negated the Claridge case by adopting
the theory expressly repudiated by that case. It reworded sec-
tion 60 so that all the elements of a preference would be tested
as of the time of recording, thereby postdating many such trans-
fers to within four months of bankruptcy and transforming trans-
fers for contemporaneous value into transfers on account of an-
tecedent debts. 0 By this fiction, belatedly recorded liens be-
27. H.R. REP. No. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1910).
28. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, §§ 8, 11, 36 Stat. 840, 842.
29. The amendment added the following provision to section 47 (a):
[T]rustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into
the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding
a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and also, as
to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall
be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers
of a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned
unsatisfied.
Id. § 8, 36 Stat. 840. This provision was left unchanged until the major
rewriting of the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler Act of 1938, when it
was placed in section 70(c). The Chandler Act reworded the section,
and it has since been reworded three times, but without changing its
substance. The current version states:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights
and powers of: (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against
the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such
a creditor exists, (2) a creditor who upon the date of bank-
ruptcy obtained an execution returned unsatisfied against the
bankrupt, whether or not such a creditor exists, and (3) a
creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings upon all property, whether or not
coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a
creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have
obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
Acr, supra note 1, § 70(c).
30. The amendment rewrote section 60 (b) to read:
[Vol. 54:737
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came preferences in law whether or not they were preferences
in fact. In arguing for this change, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee said:
The real trouble it seems is this: There are, in reality two
times of "transfer" in such cases: as between the transferror
and transferee obviously the time of transfer is the time of the
original execution and delivery of the instrument to the grantee
or transferee, regardless of its registration, but as to other
creditors and the rest of the outer world, the "transfer" is, by
the state statute, not a complete "transfer" at all until recording,
until delivery to the public recorder-then and not until then
the debtor signifying to outside parties, to all others who might
become interested in his assets, the effectual separation of the
liened property from the rest of his assets. This, it must be
conceded, is the bottom principle upon which rest the recording
statutes of all our states. It is also the bottom principle of the
right to legislate against secret liens. Thus, in our bankruptcy
preference statute, the great object likewise should be to make
clear that the "transfer," so far as outside parties becoming
interested in the estate are concerned, is not complete or per-
haps is not even to be considered a "transfer" at all (in cases
where state law requires recording as against creditors) until
delivery of the instrument to the recorder for registration.
Creditors, then, by these state Supreme Court decisions
[like the Claridge case] construing the preference provisions of
the present bankruptcy act, must be able to prove that at the
time of the "transfer," perhaps several years beforehand, the
debtor was then insolvent, the debt was then a past, a pre-
existing, debt, etc.-a practical impossibility; indeed an unrea-
sonable requirement, since it is the present insolvent fund of
the debtor that is rightly involved and not some ancient fund
existing years beforehand.
The proposed amendment squarely and clearly makes the
date of the recording . . . the date at which the creditor
[trustee?] is to prove the existence of all the elements of a
preference. ... It brings forward to the date of recording the
proof of the insolvency and all the other operative facts of the
preference and makes the section conform to the real and actual
intentions of the framers of the amendment of 1903.31
If a bankrupt shall . . . have made a transfer of any of his
property, and if, at the time of the transfer . . . or of the re-
cording or registering of the transfer if by law recording or
registering thereof is required, and being within four months be-
fore the filing of the petition in bankruptcy ... ,the bankrupt
be insolvent and the.., transfer then operate as a preference,
and the person receiving it ... shall then have reasonable
cause to believe that the ... transfer would effect a preference,
it shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover the
property or its value from such person.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 11, 36 Stat. 842.
31. H.R. REP. No. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1910), S. REP. No.
691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1910). The Senate report continued:
Indeed, it is perhaps merely declaratory of the law as it exists
today, as laid down in the following cases, to wit, Bank v.
Connett, 143 F. 35.... But there are contrary holdings. The
19701
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Thus, by the amendment of 1910, Congress attempted to
make secret transfers not recorded until the eve of bankruptcy
voidable as though they were preferences, whether or not they
were preferences in fact. The section was so unartfully drawn,
however, that it failed in accomplishing its purpose. First, not
all security arrangements came within its purview.32 Second,
the Senate's deletion in 1903 of any reference to permitted (as
contrasted with required) recording -was continued, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court gave meaning to that deletion by
holding the section inapplicable in cases where the particular re-
cording act did not protect creditors actually participating in
the bankruptcy.33 Thus, where a recording act protected only
levying creditors, the holder of a secret lien would lose his se-
curity if he failed to record it because the strong arm clause
would give the trustee the powers of a levying creditor. But
if he recorded on the eve of bankruptcy, he would not only be
immune from the trustee's strong arm powers, he would usually
be able to withstand an attack under section 60 because the re-
cording would not be "required" within the meaning of that
section. Finally, the holder of an "equitable lien" (an enforce-
able promise by the debtor to grant a lien in the future) en-
joyed a similar position. His right to such a lien would fall in
the face of the trustee's strong arm powers, but if he should be
granted a "legal" lien on the eve of bankruptcy and promptly
record it, that lien would, as a matter of common law, be held
to relate back to the date of the enforceable promise. This date
was usually more than four months before bankruptcy and often
contemporaneous with the loan involved.34
question is continually arising, and is a frequent source of liti-
gation. It is of such importance that it should be set at rest.
Id. at 9.
32. Belatedly recorded conditional sales were held not to come
within the section because the retention of security title was not a
transfer from the debtor which depleted his estate. Bailey v. Baker Ice
Mach. Co., 239 U.S. 268 (1915).
33. Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916); Martin v. Commercial
Nat'l Bank, 245 U.S. 513 (1918). This prob[em had divided the circuits
shortly after the 1903 amendment was adopted. See note 17 supra.
However, Congress appears not to have been aware of the problem
when it enacted the 1910 amendment. An amendment in 1926 added the
words "or permitted" to section 60 in an attempt to cure this problem.
Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 14, 44 Stat. ;566. The words were, how-
ever, inserted in the wrong place and the courts continued to follow
Carey and Martin. See Hirschfeld v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234, 237 (E.D.
Ill. 1933).
34. See Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
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Twenty-eight years later the Chandler Act 35 overcame these
difficulties by shunning any explicit mention of recording and
stating the test instead in terms of the result recording achieves
under local law. Before, all transfers were deemed to have been
made at the time of any "required" recording. Now they were
deemed to have been made when they had been so perfected that,
under local law, no bona fide purchaser and no creditor of the
transferor could thereafter acquire rights-superior to the trans-
feree; in the absence of any such perfection, all transfers were
deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy.80
This simple and short provision seemed to meet all the problems.
For most transactions, of course, it timed the transfer when it
was, in fact, made. A payment in money or the delivery of per-
sonal property to a creditor was deemed to occur when it had
actually happened, so that if such transactions were preferential
and occurred within four months of bankruptcy, they were void-
able. However, in recordable transactions, the idea that recorda-
tion might be merely permissive but not required was put to
rest. Where local law required recording to protect either pur-
chasers or creditors, delay or failure to record would postdate the
transaction and transform it into a preference as of the date of
the recording or, in the absence of any record, as of the instant
before bankruptcy. 7 This provision also solved the difficult
equitable lien problem. Since latent equities are inferior to the
rights of bona fide purchasers without notice, secret equitable
liens would not be recognized under the bona fide purchaser
test. The creditor's right to an encumbrance of the assets could
have been defeated by a sale of those assets to a bona fide pur-
chaser any time prior to the actual grant of the promised lien.
Thus, the final lien could not be deemed to relate back to any
35. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
36. For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a
transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it
became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the
debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected
prior to the filing of the petition . . . it shall be deemed to
have been made immediately before bankruptcy.
Id. § 60, 52 Stat. at 869-70.
37. This was also intended to bring unrecorded conditional sales
within the section. See note 32 supra. Recording acts generally protect
purchasers or creditors from the vendor's interest under an unrecorded
conditional sale contract. In 1952, to further clarify this matter, the
definition of transfer in section 1(30) was amended to include "the re-
tention of a security title to property delivered to a debtor." Act of
July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 1, 66 Stat. 420.
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earlier date.
Prior to the Chandler Act, most commentary concerning
section 60 pointed out the inadequacies resulting from the failure
of the 1910 amendments to accomplish their purpose. When the
Chandler Act overcame those difficulties, a new line of criticism
appeared. Section 60 now seemed to do much more than had
been intended. The criticism was triggered by Corn Exchange
National Bank & Trust Company v. Klauder,38 which struck down
assignments of accounts receivable even though local law made
no provision for their recording or publication, and thus illus-
trated that section 60 could void some transactions which were
neither preferences nor unduly secret. Under the law of many
jurisdictions, a second assignee of accounts receivable would pre-
vail over the first assignee unless the account obligor had been in-
formed of the first assignment. The rule had been adopted merely
as a method of resolving disputes between competing assignees
of the same account, not to notify the community of creditors
that an account had been assigned. Indeed, informing the ac-
count obligor would not necessarily make the information a
matter of common knowledge. But tlds rule made voidable in
bankruptcy any lien on accounts receivable unless each account
obligor was informed of the lien, since prior to such notice the
lien was not perfected as against a hypothetical bona fide pur-
chaser of the account.
Following Klauder fears were voiced concerning other kinds
of secured transactions. For example, some creditors and pur-
chasers have a kind of super-priority such that recording a lien
will not protect it from their claims. For instance, South Caro-
lina had a statute giving a judgment for personal injuries arising
out of an automobile accident priority over all liens on the ve-
hicle involved (other than tax liens), whether recorded or not.39
A similar problem arises in connection with liens on inventory.
The instruments creating such liens provide that the liens will
not follow the goods into the hands of the borrower's custom-
ers4 0 Thus, recording does not protect all liens against all
38. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
39. S.C. CoDE § 8792 (1942), since repealed.
40. UNIFORM TRuST RECEiPTS ACT § 9(2) (a) (i) provided that "[a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade] takes free of the entruster's
security interest in the goods so sold, and no filing shall constitute notice
of the entruster's security interest to such a buyer." Factors lien acts
had similar provision. For example, ch. E90, § 5 [1947] MAnn. Laws
1021 provided that "[P]urchasers for value in the ordinary course of the
business of the borrower shall take the merchandise free and clear of
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creditors and all purchasers. It was feared that courts after
Klauder would hold these liens unperfected and hence deemed
to have been given just prior to bankruptcy when they would
be preferential. Finally, it was suggested that the normal mort-
gage might be deemed a preference even though given to secure
contemporaneous credit. In practice, recording is accomplished
shortly after the loan is made. Courts could construe this as a
continuing transaction; but should they focus on events instant
by instant, they would detect a gap between loan and recording
and could deem the mortgage as given at the instant of recording
and hence to secure an antecedent debt.41
It should be noted that at the time these fears were first
broached they had no concrete basis. The accounts receivable
problem was being corrected by state statutes which nullified
the rights of second assignees of accounts, thereby making the
reasoning of Klauder inapplicable. The other dangers had been,
primarily, abstract suppositions of what courts might do in the
absence of much evidence of what they would do. However,
secured creditors, as a class, are anxious to limit their risks, and
their spokesmen were urging change.42 Then three cases gave
the factor's lien provided for herein, whether or not they have knowledge
of the existence of such lien." The UNiFoRl CONDITIONAL SALES ACT§ 9, provided that
[W]hen goods are delivered under a conditional sale contract
and the seller expressly or impliedly consents that the buyer
may resell them prior to performance of the condition, the
reservation of property shall be void against purchasers from
the buyer in the ordinary course of business, and as to them
the buyer shall be deemed the owner of the goods, even though
the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed according to the pro-
visions of this act.
Some states enacted similar provisions concerning chattel mortgages.
See, e.g., ch. 842, § 6, [1941] N.Y. Laws. All of these provisions have
been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code, which also gives
buyers in the ordinary course of business priority over a perfected
security interest. UNroMv COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307 [hereinafter
cited as U.C.C.].
41. In the few cases which faced this issue, the mortgages were
generally held not preferential. In re Metropolitan Dairy Co., 224
F. 444 (2d Cir. 1915) (resolution authorizing mortgage on June 14, loan
advanced June 17, mortgage executed June 23 and filed June 26); In re
E. H. Webb Grocery Co., 32 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Tenn. 1940) (mortgage
filed the day after the loan). But one case held a mortgage recorded
two days after execution to be preferential. Local law only permitted
a reasonable delay, and where the mortgage was executed within a mile
of the recorder's office a delay of more than a few hours would be
unreasonable. In re Coombs, 37 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
42. The alarm was sounded in the following articles: Hanna,
Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. CNi. L. REV. 311 (1948); Keefe, Kelly
& Lewis, Sick Sixty: A Proposed Revision of Section 60a of the Bank-
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some reality to the fear that inventory financing could not with-
stand the super-priority of a hypothetical buyer in the ordinary
course of business, 43 and in 1950 the section was amended to its
present form.44
The new provision was built in layers. Since the bona fide
purchaser test had caused some of the problems, if that test
were excluded and the creditor test retained, those problems
would be solved. But no such amendment was practical in the
real property field, because many state recording acts protect
only subsequent purchasers of realty. Therefore, the purchaser
test was retained as to realty, and the creditor test was used for
all other assets. But, to eliminate the problem of the special
creditor with super-priority under local law, "creditor" was de-
fined as a simple contract creditor. The switch to a creditor test
might have revived the equitable lien problem, since the pur-
chaser test had been included to invoke the well established rule
that such equities would not be good against a purchaser without
notice; so section 60(a) (6) was inserted to bring back the pur-
chaser test in such cases. But then, to prevent the reintroduced
purchaser test from knocking out inventory financing schemes,
an exception was made to exclude the purchaser in the ordinary
course of trade. Finally, section 60(a) (7) added a grace period
of no more than 21 days so that recording would not postdate
a transfer if the record was made within that grace period.
Thus, from a simple, one sentence provision, section 60(a) has
been expanded to a cumbersome, eight paragraph provision, with
some paragraphs practically incomprehensible.
ruptcy Act, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1947); Kupfer, Progress in the Amend-
ment of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 13 LAw & CoNxEVWp. PROB.
624 (1948); Kupfer & Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 VA. L.
REV. 910 (1946); McLaughlin, Defining a :Preference in Bankruptcy, 60
HARv. L. REV. 233 (1946).
Others were not so worried: Martin, Substantive Regulation of
Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy Power, 48 CoLumv. L. RnV. 62(1948); Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improve-
ment or Retrogression? 57 YALE L.J. 683 (1948); Oglebay, Proposed
Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step Backward, 51
Com. L.J. 263 (1946).
43. In re Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950)(trust receipt); In re Baltimore Casting Corp., Bkcy No. 10,000 (D. Md.
1949); In re Liberty Motors & Eng'r Corp., Bkcy No. 10,012 (D. Md.
1949). The last two cases are referee's opinions involving factor's liens
cited in Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commer-
cial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 76, 86 n.61 (1951).
44. Act of Mar. 16, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 24.
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C. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM CONFUSING UNPERFECTED
TRANSFERS Wm PREFERENCES
Are there still troubles? Of course there are. For a while,
the equitable lien came back to haunt us, because the meaning
of section 60 (a) (6) was so obscure. It was not clear when the
court should shift from the creditor test to the purchaser test,
and at least one court failed to make the shift when it should
have.45 The equitable lien problem has finally been put to rest-
not by any reform of bankruptcy law, but by the expunging of
such liens from the local law through the adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.40 But the U.C.C. has also changed the
kind of legal liens available under local law. It has regularized
the floating lien, and the fate of these liens in the face of section
60 is currently the object of considerable scholarly comment.
The objective of the floating lienor is to perfect a lien upon
a shifting quantum of goods or accounts or both. Inventories
and receivables are the major assets of many businesses. If
those firms are to give substantial security to their major sources
of funds, these assets must be encumbered. Yet the mass of
these assets is always shifting. Before the adoption of the
U.C.C., a number of techniques had been devised to encumber
such assets: trust recipients, statutory factor's liens, field ware-
housing and assignments of accounts receivable. These tech-
niques usually involved rituals whereby agents of the lender
"policed" the sequence of liens by making sure that no encum-
bered asset was released until a new asset was encumbered.
These rituals can serve important business purposes. They
help assure the lender that his borrower will not spirit away the
collateral. They also assure continuity of collateral since the
policing agents will not allow old collateral to be released until
new collateral is forthcoming. But in some cases, the lender
does not fear that the borrower will convert the collateral and
the particular business is such that there is little risk of serious
gaps in the stream of collateral. Nevertheless, the lender in such
a situation was not privileged, under the old rules, to waive polic-
ing requirements. Policing was necessary to avoid the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner,47 which deemed fraudulent as a matter of law
45. Porter v. Searle, 228 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1955).
46. U.C.C. § 9-203. But caveat, the equitable lien is alive and well
in Michigan. Warren Tool Co. v. Stevenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161
N.W.2d 133 (1968). Also, it still can attach to real property, but the
purchaser test of section 60(a) (2) prevents any subsequent real mort-
gage from relating back.
47. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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transactions where the borrower retained "dominion" over the
collateral. Moreover, this deliberate matching of old liens on
items withdrawn from the collateral with liens on new items
added to the collateral saved the new liens from the bite of sec-
tion 60. Each new lien was in consideration of the contempora-
neous release of an old one, so it was not a preference. In the
cases where policing served no business purpose, the law's per-
vasive policing requirements merely added to the cost of credit.
Finally, these rules were a source of worry and concern to lend-
ers. If their agents made a slip in the ritual, the entire transac-
tion might be vulnerable to attack under section 60 and under
Benedict.
Article nine of the U.C.C. put this requirement to rest. The
Benedict rule was eliminated.48 Liens on after-acquired prop-
erty were validated, with some minor exceptions. 49 Provision
was made for the lifting of liens from encumbered property
sold to the borrower's customers ° and for the transferring of
such liens to the proceeds of the sales should the parties so spe-
cify.51 The danger that other creditors might be misled by the
debtor's apparent dominion over the assets was removed by re-
quiring notice filing of the particular arrangement in order to
protect the lien.52 Thereafter the lender would have a lien on
all the items specified in the arrangement and his lien would be
superior to those of any subsequent levying creditors.
With the lender's agents gone, and nothing being done to
assure the immediate replacement oil expired liens with new
ones, a preference problem can arise. If the floating lien em-
braces all assets of a given kind, such as accounts receivable, each
sale from inventory which creates a new account gives the
lender additional security for his antecedent debt. If he is al-
ready completely secured, the new security is of no additional
value to him, so he has not been preferred. But if he is only
partially secured before this new lien attaches, it will improve
his position vis-a-vis the general unsecured creditors of his
48. U.C.C. § 9-205.
49. U.C.C. § 9-204(3). Two exceptions were made for future crops
and consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-204 (4).
50. U.C.C. §§ 9-307 to 9-309.
51. U.C.C. § 9-306. If the parties have not so specified, the lien
continues in the proceeds but is subject to attack by other creditors
after 10 days. Thus policing to segregate the proceeds and continue the
lien for more than 10 days might be desirable, but failure to police does
not put the entire transaction in jeopardy.
52. U.C.C. § 9-304. In the alternative, the lender may take posses-
sion of the collateral. Id. at § 9-305.
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debtor, and he will receive a preference. This can happen even
though in the long run the creditor's position is unchanged.
Assume a debt which is partially secured by a pledge of ac-
counts. Each morning, the debtor opens his mail and finds both
new orders and payments on old accounts. He deposits the
checks before noon and fills the orders at the close of the day.
By noon the amount of the creditor's security has been decreased
by the liquidation of the paid accounts.5 3 But at the end of the
day, the amount is increased by virtue of the new sales; he is
as secure as he was before the morning mail came. The next
day his security will again decrease in the middle of the day,
only to increase again when the day's orders are filled. It should
be kept in mind that these transactions involve no secret lien
problem. The notice filing provision of the U.C.C. permits all
other creditors to know what is going on. If these new liens are
preferences, they are typical preferences-transfers to a creditor
on account of an antecedent debt.
The draftsmen of the U.C.C. could easily solve the prob-
lem of Benedict, since it was a matter of state law and could
be repealed. They could also avoid any problem of secret liens
by requiring notice filing or delivery. But it is not clear that
they could do anything about the problem of preferences in
bankruptcy. They tried to do so, however, by enacting a fiction
that new liens arising under a floating lien agreement are deemed
to have been given for new value.5 4 Since contemporaneous
value prevents a transfer from being a preference, this fiction, if
accepted, would have solved the problem.5 5 There is in fact no
contemporaneous value in the above example, since the value
53. This is a simplification, because U.C.C. § 9-306 preserves a
lien on the "proceeds," in this case the bank deposit, for 10 days. If
the debtor's bank account is kept large enough to include all deposits
made within the last 10 days, the creditor's security is not decreased by
the conversion of accounts receivable into bank deposits, but he loses a
perfected security interest in the bank account 10 days later. Each
noon, then, his security is decreased by the amount deposited 10 days
previously as his lien on those proceeds goes stale. Of course, if the
debtor constantly depletes his bank account to pay current expenses the
creditor's lien on proceeds is meaningless. There will be no identifi-
able proceeds for it to encumber.
54. U.C.C. § 9-108.
55. This provision is a bold-faced attempt to amend the Bank-
ruptcy Act by means of state law, and has been the object of scholarly
comment and scorn. Much of the largely critical scholarly comment on
U.C.C. § 9-105 is gathered in Healy, The Floating Lien Controversy in
the Courts: Judicial Response to the Preference Problem, 10 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. Ruv. 265 nn.3 & 4 (1969).
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given in return for each evening's new liens is the release
of liens on accounts that morning. There may be recent value,
but there is no new value. And at times, where the cycle is a
long one, there is not even recent value. For example, a con-
tractor building a series of large structures may have a cycle
of several years. Or there may be no cycle at all, the amount
of assets encumbered increasing steadily.
The terms in which bankruptcy scholars argue these cases
have been amply discussed elsewhere and need only be alluded
to here. They fall into two classes. There is the distant view,
whereby the individual members of the encumbered class seem
insignificant and the gaps between liens on successive members
of the class are overlooked. Additions to the class, whereby
security is increased, appear to be merely a growth of what was
already encumbered. From such a viewpoint, floating liens cre-
ate no preferences. On the other hand, there is the myopic view
where each individual member of the class looms large. Gaps
between successive members of the c'lass become material. Ad-
ditions to the class create new liens. Under this view, floating
liens create preferences if, at any time, the lienor was not fully
secured and the debtor was insolvent. But neither point of
view looks to the underlying issue, namely, whether the or-
dained scheme of distribution in bankruptcy has been unduly
thwarted by transactions on the eve of bankruptcy. Of course,
the lienor is claiming more than his pro rata share of the debtor's
assets, but the theme of bankruptcy distribution is not equality
at the expense of lienors. These arguments shed no light on the
question of whether there was a lien given as a preference.
And yet, floating liens present a unique opportunity to ef-
fect preferences. A debt which is partially secured by such a
lien can be preferred by feeding the lien. For instance, a lien on
accounts receivable can be fed by reducing prices, thus increas-
ing sales on account and the value of encumbered receivables.
A debtor who has the necessary cash or credit can feed an in-
ventory lien by increasing inventory. In all cases thus far re-
ported, there seems to have been no feeding. The value of the
collateral has declined as bankruptcy came near. This is to be
expected. Yet the case will certainly arise where a debtor in
failing circumstances will intentionally feed a lien to curry favor
with his major source of credit in the hope of obtaining credit
56. See Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Prefer-
ence Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L.Q.
553 (1968).
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for some future venture.
The fiction in section 60, however, makes impossible any
attempt to avoid such feeding. That section fictitiously dates
all transfers, deeming them to have been made at the date of
perfection. The original purpose of this fiction was to postdate
transfers so that belatedly perfected transactions could be
deemed preferential whether or not they actually were. But
there is no "One Way" sign in section 60. It can predate trans-
fers also, deeming all liens under a properly filed financing ar-
rangement to have been made at the date of filing, usually before
the credit to be secured was extended.5 7 This theory has found
judicial favor. 8 Let a failing debtor manipulate his business
to favor the holder of a floating lien. The creditor will assert
under section 60 that all liens are deemed to have been given
at the date of the filing of the notice-usually long before the
four month period and before any credit was actually extended.
The lien is then deemed to be one to secure future advances so
it cannot be a preference; and in any event, it is too old.
II. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
This history of section 60 and the difficulties which we have
encountered with it seem to indicate that a wrong turn was
made in 1910 when the fictitious dating of transfers was first
enacted. The real difficulty with that fiction was not immedi-
ately apparent because the 1910 version was riddled with loop-
holes; but since 1938, when the loopholes were finally filled,
most of the section 60 troubles are traceable to that fiction. It
voids transactions which ought not to be avoided and threatens
to preserve transactions which ought not to be preserved.
Not only does this fiction regularly surprise us with unfore-
seen consequences; like many legal fictions it falls just a bit wide
of the mark. By definition, fictions equate things which are
in fact different. By transforming the secret lienor into a
preferred creditor, section 60 has accorded the lienor all the
57. See King, Some Thoughts on Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 72 Com. L.J. 203, 206 (1967).
King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It Insulate
the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy? 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 1117, 1132-33 (1966).
58. See DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969), Grain Mer-
chants v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied sub nom., France v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 396 U.S. 827
(1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D. Mass. 1967).
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immunities of such a creditor. The casually preferred creditor,
having no reasonable cause to believe his debtor was in financial
difficulty is perhaps worthy of protection and in fact is pro-
tected under section 60 (b). The secret lienor is not equally
worthy. Unlike the casually preferred creditor, who has be-
haved according to accepted business norms and has not con-
nived with his debtor, the secret lienor has breached accepted
norms and laid a trap for his fellow creditors. He has misrep-
resented the financial condition of his debtor; the degree of his
culpability will vary from instances of intentional misrepresen-
tation to mere oversight. However, he will never be com-
pletely innocent unless he lifts the veil of secrecy by recording
in time for other creditors to protect themselves before bank-
ruptcy. If bankruptcy comes too soon, and the lien ought to be
avoided, the lienor's state of mind at the time of perfection is
completely irrelevant to the issue. Whether or not other cred-
itors were misled depends upon their state of mind, not his; yet
section 60(b) requires proof that he had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor insolvent at the time of perfection.
As further proof of the inappropriateness of this require-
ment in secret lien cases, the lienor's state of mind is not material
where the trustee invokes the strong arm clause of section 70 (c).
This results in an anomaly when cases of liens belatedly per-
fected are compared with cases of liens never perfected. Both
are now preferences under section 60. The former are deemed
to have been given at the time of perfection, the latter immedi-
ately before the petition, but both are deemed to have been
given for antecedent debts within four months of bankruptcy
to creditors who were theretofore unsecured. In attacking a
totally unperfected lien; the trustee would rarely use section
60; he would prefer to use section 70(c), since he would only
have to show that a hypothetical levying creditor could have
superseded the secret lienor at the time of the petition. In at-
tacking the belatedly perfected lien, however, the trustee could
not make such a showing and would have to proceed under
section 60(b), thereby assuming the burden of proving that the
lienor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent at
the date of perfection. The trustee will normally win his 70(c)
action but will sometimes lose his 60(b) suit, though in neither
case does the creditor deserve to keep his lien.
In attacking liens on real property, however, the trustee
might be forced to use section 60 even against liens never per-
fected. Though most recording acts protect creditors as well as
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purchasers, many in the field of real property protect only pur-
chasers. Hence the trustee may be unable to show that a hy-
pothetical levying creditor could supercede an unrecorded real
mortgage on the date of the petition. This leads to another
anomaly when the fate of an unrecorded mortgage on real prop-
erty is compared to that of an unrecorded lien on personalty.
As to the latter, the trustee could use the strong arm clause, but
he would be relegated to section 60 in attacking the real estate
mortgage. The lien on personalty would be avoided, while the
real property mortgage might stand unless it could be shown that
the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insol-
vent on the day of the petition.59 But both transferees are
equally blameworthy; there is no reason to treat them differ-
ently.60
A. A NEW PROVISION FOR SECRET LIENS AND MODIFICATION
OF THE PREFERENCE PROVISION
This suggests that what is needed now, and what was
needed in 1910, is a special provision to handle the secret lien
problem without fictions that transform such liens into other
voidable transactions-a provision which makes no distinction
between liens kept secret until shortly before bankruptcy and
liens kept secret until after bankruptcy. Congress, in enacting
the strong arm clause in 1910, recognized that a new section
was needed, but its point of view was narrowed by the preced-
ents it sought to correct; seeing two lines of precedent, it en-
acted two different provisions. There is no reason to continue
this two-pronged approach. The strong arm clause now requires
perfection of transfers as of the date of bankruptcy, using a
judicial lien test of perfection. A similar provision which voids
59. Under section 60(a) (2) the fictional date of the mortgage
would be the date of the petition in bankruptcy, usually a time when
the debtor's insolvency is extreme and patent. Thus the trustee will
lose few of these cases. He will usually be able to show reasonable
cause as of the date of the petition, but there will be an occasional case
where such proof is wanting. A mortgagee from a distant community
who has received all of his payments on schedule may have no reason
to know his debtor is insolvent.
60. It could be argued that this anomaly is one of state law, not
bankruptcy law, since it stems from differences between the state
recording acts involved. However, there has been a policy of preventing
this difference in state recording acts from spilling over into bankruptcy,
as evidenced by section 60(a) (2), which provides a different test of
perfection for real property so that section 60 will have the same force
against real and personal liens.
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all transfers which were unperfected at any time within the four
months prior to bankruptcy and which uses a workable test of
perfection 61 would solve the entire secret lien problem.
Such a section could follow the pattern of many present
bankruptcy provisions. Where recording is appropriate, all un-
recorded transfers, whether by way of lien or grant, could be
condemned if the failure to record continued into the crucial
four month period and the debtor was insolvent. A grace period
of 21 days (or some other appropriate period) could be per-
mitted during which nonperfection would be excused. Voided
transfers could be preserved for the benefit of the estate at the
trustee's option. Jurisdiction to hear controversies concerning
these matters could be granted to state and bankruptcy courts.
An amendment along these lines would make possible other
changes in the Act. Section 70(c), the strong arm clause, would
no longer be needed to strike down secret liens. It has, however,
proved valuable in other contexts and it might well be retained
in its present form.62 In addition, the troublesome fiction could
61. The judicial lien test of section 70 is not workable in cases
involving real property. Many recording acts only protect subsequent
purchasers of realty. Furthermore, the purchaser test effectively destroys
equitable liens. Such liens are still possible as to realty, and as to
personalty the matter is in flux. See note 46 supra. It would bepossible, however, to have a split test much along the lines of section60(a) (2), with suitable limitations to prevent the use of hypothetical
claimants with super-priority as tests. See notes 39 & 40 supra. My
preference is for a single good faith purchaser test for all assets. Butit really comes down to a matter of aesthetics, rather than law, since
practically the same results can be achieved either way. The single test
can be stated more simply in the statute. It also avoids a knotty
problem concerning fixtures. See Kohn, Preferential Transfers on the
Eve of the Bankruptcy Amendments, 2 PROSPECTUS 259, 269-271 (1968).
On the other hand, it might give rise to some problems concerning con-
signments, the solution of which would destroy the simplicity of a
single test statute. See note 78 infra.
62. For instance, the trustee's section 70 (c) rights against secret
federal tax liens have been finally settled in United States v. Speers,
382 U.S. 266 (1965). It would be unwise to jeopardize the holding of
the Speers case by repealing section 70 (c) and thereby giving the courts
an opportunity to make their old mistakes under the proposed new sec-
tion.
In addition, the trustee can avoid secret consignments in the bank-
ruptcy of the consignee under section 70(c). See U.C.C. §§ 2-326(2),(3). Retention of a consignor's interest in a true consignment is not a
transfer within section 1(30), so the status of consignments under the
proposed new section is in doubt. Repeal of section 70 (c) might leave
some secret consignments immune from attack. This suggests however,
the need for amending section 1(0) to handle the problem.
In general, there is a certain symmetry in leaving section 70(c) in
the Act. An involuntary petition in bankruptcy is, from the petitioning
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then be removed from section 60. Thus, the new version would
apply only to true preferences. By removing secret liens from
section 60, the second act of bankruptcy would be similarly lim-
ited, and to avoid a change in the law additions to section 3
would be necessary to make the granting or suffering of a secret
lien an act of bankruptcy. Examples of amendments along
these lines are appended to this article.
These amendments would not only effectuate the legislative
intent of the 1910 amendments; they would also meet the needs
seen in 1903. The 1903 amendment sought to condemn prefer-
ences more than four months old which were withheld from
record until four months before bankruptcy. The new section
would void all transfers withheld from record, whether prefer-
ential or not.
B. A GRACE PERIOD FOR ALL PREFERENcES
Although section 60 should be amended to limit it to its
original role of avoiding actual preferences, one of its provisions
which now applies primarily to secured transactions ought to be
retained and given wider application. The grace period of sec-
tion 60 (a) (7) excuses short delays in the perfection of transfers.
This provision was enacted to protect transactions which require
a ritual such as recording for their perfection, so that such
transactions would not be regarded as preferential merely be-
cause the ritual could not be performed at the same instant as
the rest of the transaction. But, in this regard, transactions re-
quiring perfection rituals are not unique. Many other transac-
tions take time. What is unique about transactions involving
perfection rituals is that many of them are secured transactions,
and secured transactions occupied center stage at the time of
the 1950 amendments. The application of section 60 to unse-
cured transactions was not under consideration at that time.
When a grace period was enacted, it was intended to fit the
needs of secured transactions as they were then understood.
It was feared that delays in perfection would convert what were
functionally contemporaneous transfers into preferences. The
creditors' viewpoint, an alternative to proceeding at law to assert their
creditors' rights. It appears unwise to give the debtor immunities in
bankruptcy he would not have enjoyed in the creditors' proceeding. In
a voluntary proceeding the debtor is trying to forestall his creditors'
use of state creditors' process; but he should not be able thereby to
put some assets beyond his creditors which, under that process, they
could have reached.
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
danger of other delays was not recognized. Consideration
should be given to providing a grace period for all transfers-
those which require some additional act of perfection and those
which do not.
A great number of routine transactions have small, imma-
terial gaps if transactions are analyzed on a fine enough time
scale. Even payment at a gasoline station is for an antecedent
debt. A great number of transactions are paid by checks which
are honored in due course, but at a time after the sale. The
usual blue collar-white collar division of labor often requires
that delivery of goods be made by one set of agents and accept-
ance of payment by another. Sale on 10 day terms to facilitate
this kind of transaction is not generally thought to be a sig-
nificant extension of credit. Furthermore, many things cannot
be paid for even when the debt is incurred. Utility bills cannot
be calculated until the meters are read. Wages and rents must
be paid periodically though the buyer enjoys the fruits over
continuous periods of time. Many dealings are not instantane-
ous and thus do not fit the pattern that seems normative under
section 60.
For a number of reasons few of these transactions have
given the courts trouble. First, the transferee does not usually
have reasonable cause to believe the transferor insolvent. Most
sellers who have such cause demand cash on delivery, not be-
cause of any rule in bankruptcy but out of fear of nonpayment.
Most wage earners have no insight into the financial condition
of their employers, and some payments to them cannot be pref-
erential because of their priority in bankruptcy.63 Rents are
usually paid in advance, and no bankrupt lessor's trustee has
claimed that the tenant's subsequent quiet enjoyment and use
was a "transfer . . . on account of an. antecedent debt."(6 4 Fi-
63. Section 64(a) (2) gives priority to "wages and commissions, not
to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three
months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding .... 
Since a preference is defined as a payment which enables a recipient
creditor "to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class," section 60 (a) (1), and different classes are
defined by section 64(a), it is said that "payment of a debtor of wages
to his employees, within the terms of section 64(a) (2), would not con-
stitute a preference so long as all employees were paid alike and were
not paid in excess of their priority .. . ." 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
I 60.34 at 907 (14th ed. 1969).
64. In leases of real estate any such aLtack would flounder on the
concept that the lessee purchased a leasehold, an estate in land, at the
time of the lease or at the time he paid the rent. His subsequent en-joyment and possession, then, would not be the quid pro quo for his
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nally, the courts have often had good sense to avoid analyzing
transactions on such a minute time scale. Multiple acts are
looked upon as a single transaction 65
There are, however, cases which can cause difficulty. Sell-
ers discover facts which should put them on their guard after
they have granted the usual 10 day period for payment. Be-
cause of inflation, employees' wages are now likely to exceed
the value of their statutory priority. In any event, that priority
is only for three months whereas payments four months old
can be avoided as preferential. 66 The debtor's bookkeeper is one
payment but merely an incident of the leasehold he acquired at that
earlier instant. Equipment leases, on the other hand, may not have the
benefit of such ancient learning, particularly where the bailment is at
will or for an indefinite time.
65. Sales: Cumberland Portland Cement Co., v. Reconstruction
Fin. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), afi'd on other grounds
sub nom., Ralph Rogers & Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 232 F.2d
930 (6th Cir. 1956) (mere delay of a few days does not convert a cash
sale into a credit transaction); Dunn v. E. L. Gayvert & Co., 263 App.
Div. 785, 31 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1941), appeal dismissed, 288 N.Y. 669, 43
N.E.2d 72 (1942) (payment of utility bills. "Those services were essen-
tial to the operation of the Kendall Station .... Payment of the
aforementioned itms was in no sense preferential."); In re Perpall,
271 F. 466 (Manton, J.) (2d Cir. 1921) (delivery of bonds at 10:30 a.m.,
partial payment therefor at 3:00 p.m., 10 minutes before the petition
was filed). Compare In re John Morrow & Co., 134 F. 686 (S.D. Ohio
1901). See language quoted, note 68 infra.
Payment by check: Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951);
Engstrom v. Benzel, 191 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951). For reasons not
apparent, the trustee in bankruptcy in both these cases sought to avoid
the payments under a state preference statute rather than section 60. In
Benzel the check was dishonored and had to be redeposited. Since no
credit was intended the ultimate honoring of these checks was held non-
preferential. Compare Engelkes v. Farmers Cooperative Co., 194 F.
Supp. 319 (N.D. Iowa 1961), where a check was dishonored and re-
deposited a number of times. The court assumed that had it been in-
itially honored there would have been no preference, but dishonor plus
redeposit converted the sale to a credit transaction. See also Note, Cash
Sales: Bad Check Doctrine Waiver: Voidable Preference, 37 CONMELL
L.Q. 477 (1952).
Payments to employees: Blauvelt v. Walker, 72 F.2d 915 (4th Cir.
1934) (wages paid during the month earned are paid for a present con-
sideration); Bridgers v. Hart, 200 N.C. 685, 158 S.E. 242 (1931) (travel
expenses of bankrupt's president reimbursed two or three days after his
return; held jury should have been permitted to decide whether or not
this was one transaction).
66. There are issues here which appear to be unexplored. The
maximum priority under section 64(a) (2) is $600. If within three
months of bankruptcy a workman has earned only $600 and that is all he
has been paid, there can be no preference problem so long as other
workmen have been treated similarly. However, suppose he has earned
$600 per month for the previous four months. At the end of January he
is owed $600 and is paid that amount. Leaving aside the argument
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person with reason to know his employer's financial condition,
and other wage earners will have reason to know if an occa-
sional payroll has been late or if the employer's troubles are
matters of common knowledge. Though courts have often as-
similated a series of events into one transaction, they have some-
times done so in the face of settled rules to the contrary.67 In
some cases there is no good guide for the courts to use in estab-
lishing the scope of the transaction.6 8 This is most obvious in
that the entire month is one transaction, so that the payment is not for
an antecedent debt (see note 67 infra), it would still not be preferen-
tial because it would be within the priority of section 64(a) (2) if the
employer filed a voluntary petition on February 1. Assume further
that the employer does not file such a petition and at the end of Feb-
ruary the workman is owed another $600 which is paid him. Is this
payment preferential? Or, alternatively, if it is not, has the previous
payment in January now become preferential? The payment at the
end of March will also raise the same issues. Assume that $600 is again
earned in April but not paid, the employer files a voluntary petition
on April 30. The employee claims his priority for the April wages.
The January payment, which was not preferential when made, is now
a preference because it is for wages earned more than three months
prior to the petition and hence beyond the reach of the statutory
priority. Have the February and March payments suffered a similar
metamorphosis because the total priority is limited to $600?
67. In Blauvelt v. Walker, 72 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1934), the bank-
rupt's bookkeeper, whose salary was $200 per month, received only $116
during the fourth month before bankruptcy. The court said:
Wage payments are not preferential, if applied on wages cur-
rently earned; for in such case the payment is made, not on a
past due debt, but for a present consideration .... [P] ayments
made on account of [wages earned during the fourth month
preceding bankruptcy] should be considered in all fairness as
having been made for a present consideration, the labor per-
formed during the month, and not on account of old debts due
the wage earner.
Id. at 916-17. The result is commendable, but it is difficult to ration-
alize. If the payment was made on the last day of the month, al-
though the bookkeeper's contract called for semimonthly payments of$100 each, it would seem obvious that $16 of the $116 would be prefer-
ential. The entire employment relationship is not one continuous
transaction. Even the Blauvelt court held preferential $316 paid during
the last three months but credited to wages earned earlier. If, then,
the relationship is a series of transactions, how long are they? One pay
period? This would be a convenient rule but one without warrant in
the statute. "Antecedent debt" does not mean "debt heretofore not due
and payable." The payment of a debt on its due date can be a prefer-
ence. Nor has commercial custom been permitted to convert a credit
transaction into a cash transaction. In re John Morrow & Co., 134 F. 686(S.D. Ohio 1901). See language quoted, note 68 infra. Consequently,
even if the $116 had been paid on the established pay day, it could
have been held preferential.
68. In answer to a contention that sale upon 10 day terms was,
by commercial usage, a cash transaction, a court answered:
If the parties, by agreement, can treat a sale of goods on 10
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the case of the floating lien since there is no middle ground
between considering the entire arrangement a single transaction
and analyzing it down to its smallest components.
In an attempt to solve many of these problems, the sug-
gested amendment of section 60 appended to this article pro-
vides a 21 day grace period for all preferential transactions.
Under this grace period approach, creditors who accepted pay-
ment by check or gave 10 day terms could retain payments sea-
sonably made whether or not they discovered disturbing facts
about the debtor in the interim.69 Payments to wage earners
would present no problems so long as the pay period was less
than three weeks and payments were kept current. Anytime a
putative preference was given in return for value received
within the previous three weeks, the transaction would be un-
disturbed.
Furthermore, this approach would more adequately handle
floating liens. In the usual case such liens would be undis-
turbed because liens on new items could be matched with liens
that had expired no more than 21 days before. Only if the hiatus
between liens exceeds the grace period is the new lien voidable
as a preference. In addition, it would not be necessary for the
trustee or the courts to match carefully each new lien with a
recently expired one. The trustee could merely calculate the
value of liens outstanding on test days no more than three
weeks apart during the four months before bankruptcy. In
many cases the bankrupt's books would give such values on a
weekly, biweekly or semimonthly basis. In most cases, these
values would resolve all issues. If the values never dipped be-
low the amount of the debt, the creditor was fully secured dur-
days' time as a cash transaction, they may also, by agree-
ment, treat a sale on 30 or 60 days or longer time as a cash
transaction, and practically defeat the operation of sections 57(g) and 60(a) of the bankrupt [sic] act. [Those sections] do
not contemplate a usage of merchants or a conventional ar-
rangement between the parties which would enable any one of
the creditors of a bankrupt to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt than any other of such creditors of the same class. A sale
of goods to be paid for in 10 or 30 days is not, in fact, a cash
transaction, and cannot, by agreement of the parties, or a usage
of merchants, be regarded as such within the meaning of the
bankrupt [sic] law.
In re John Morrow & Co., 134 F. 686, 687-88 (S.D. Ohio 1901).
69. It would also protect creditors who, knowing the insolvency of
their debtors, had extended terms or accepted payment by check and
received their money within three weeks. However, fear of nonpay-
ment would discourage most such transactions regardless of the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act.
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big the four month period and hence enjoyed no preference.
Furthermore, if the value at bankruptcy was lower than at any
previous time the creditor was not preferred because the liens at
bankruptcy were successors to earlier liens of equal or greater
value without any hiatus of more than three weeks. If, on
the other hand, these test values showed an upward trend over
the four month period, some of the final liens could not be suc-
cessors to previous ones, and the increase would be considered
preferential. Finally, if the values showed a decrease followed
by a climb, the trustee must study in detail the value of the se-
curity at the time of the dip. Dips of less than three weeks
duration would be protected by the grace period, but if the high-
est value in the worst three week period were less than the
value at bankruptcy, the difference would be preferential. Dis-
covering this value might be difficult in an occasional case, but
finding some value which clearly equalled or exceeded it would
normally not be. And in many cases, the initial test values
would show that there was no dip of three weeks duration which
required detailed study.
A committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference is cur-
rently considering a "two point" test to remedy the floating lien
problem. This test compares the value of the security on the
date of bankruptcy with its value four months earlier and voids
any increase so found.70 Professor Hogan has pointed out that
this test will catch only the grossest cases. The debtor will be
given free reign to prefer his secured creditor so long as he does
not go beyond the value of four months before. He offers the
further criticism that the test will void some unintended pref-
erences caused by business expansion or natural cyclical fluctua-
tions.71 It can be answered, however, that the likelihood of a
business failure is slight if the busines;s is either expanding or
at the top of a business cycle. Another difficulty with the two
point test is its reliance on conditions on an arbitrary day-four
months before bankruptcy. There could be an unusually low or
high amount of security on that day. For example, it might be
the day after a clearance sale or the day after the debtor, hard
pressed for cash, had solicited and received several payments
which otherwise would have been paid the following week.
The advocates of this test argue that more subtle tests would be
difficult to administer. Certainly a test that attempts to trace
the value of the security to its lowest point would be impossible
70. See Kohn, supra note 61, at 261.
71. Hogan, supra note 56, at 564-65.
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to apply. The nadir could occur at any instant during the crit-
ical four months. If a number of accounts were by chance paid
simultaneously or if an unusually large order was filled on one
day, a precipitous drop in accounts or inventory might result.
To find such a low point, the trustee would have to reconstruct
the history of the security instant by instant. Moreover, the re-
placement of this security in the next week or so would deprive
such a decrease of much commercial significance. On the other
hand, the two point test may sacrifice too much to ease of admin-
istration. Certainly the trustee could make a more detailed study
of the history of the security than that test requires. Further-
more, it dwells on the value at an arbitrary instant, four months
before bankruptcy, which may also be of little commercial signifi-
cance. The grace period approach appears workable. An instant-
by-instant study of the security is not required. It does not
search for the lowest value during the last four months, but for
the lowest value which persisted for a significant time during
that period. And, unlike the two point test, the grace period ap-
proach does not permit a debtor who is contemplating bank-
ruptcy to feed the security up to the value existing four months
before.
Furthermore, the grace period approach is consonant with
the reason behind abolition of policing requirements. The lender
on the security of a floating lien may require policing if he
feels it is necessary for him to be adequately secured. If he
lends on unpoliced security, it is because he is satisfied with the
normal continuity of collateral in the debtor's business. Expired
liens are replaced rapidly enough to suit him. As long as section
60 contains a preference provision without a grace period, law-
yers, judges and referees will have to play games with the float-
ing lien, taking either the distant view which recognizes con-
tinuity of lien no matter how discontinuous the collateral or
the myopic view which emphasizes discontinuities no matter how
small. A grace period permits a middle view which sustains
floating liens in the absence of any extended discontinuity.
While the two point test also sustains most floating liens, it is
in fact a grace period test with a period of just under four
months. An expired lien ought to be replaced more quickly than
that for the law to recognize continuity.72
72. Consider a case at the outer reaches of the two point test. A
used car dealer with a security arrangement covering all cars on his lot
discontinues business with the sale of two cars on August 1. After al-
most four months of inactivity, he acquires a car on November 29 and
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The main difficulty with the grace period approach is that
some preferences now condemned would be specifically per-
mitted. Debts less than three weeks old could be preferred, thus
decreasing the amount distributable in. bankruptcy. Would this
be undesirable? By and large, the holders of such claims would
be trade creditors. Less would be available for priority claimants;
less would be available for general creditors in the occasional
case where payments are made to them.. Insofar as general cred-
itors are also trade creditors, the class that enjoyed the benefit
would also suffer the burden. The amounts involved would
generally be small, since it would be a rare case in which a debtor
raises significant capital and repays it within three weeks. The
danger that he would borrow large sums and secure them by a
lien within three weeks is not significantly different from the
risk that security for a debt will be -withheld from record for
three weeks. The business world has been able to live with this
risk; it probably could live with the risk of a short grace period
for all transactions.
Once the grace period approach is accepted in principle,
there is some difficulty deciding what its proper length should
be. Three weeks seems appropriate because experience with it
in section 67(a) (7) indicates it does not impose too great a bur-
den on the community of unsecured creditors. However, some
factors may indicate a need for a longer period. For instance,
accounts receivable often move in a Monthly rhythm, so that a
21 day period would not span the gap between maximum val-
ues.7 3 It would, however, probably span the gap between aver-
age values, and thus assure the holder of a floating lien on re-
ceivables the average value of his lien, if he were lucky enough
for bankruptcy to occur when the estate held accounts of that
a petition in bankruptcy is filed the following day. The lien on the
single car is validated by the two point test because its value does not
exceed the value of the liens on the two cars four months before. This
case would not, of course, be typical but .t would be possible, and it
flys in the face of the underlying assumption in bankruptcy that current
creditors have made crucial decisions during the four months prior to
bankruptcy based upon the apparent financial condition of the debtor.
73. It should be kept in mind that such a lien remains perfected
as to cash proceeds for an additional 10 days under U.C.C. § 9-306.
Thus, in a business which retains an adequate cash position, a grace
period of 21 days, when added to this 10 day period, would adequately
bridge any gap in a monthly cycle. Healthy businesses which receive
cash payments on a monthly basis probably do keep reasonable cash
balances for the 10 days following such receipts in order to pay their
current expenses, but a failing business might not retain sufficient cash
or bank deposits upon which this 10 day lien could attach.
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value.74 However, some transactions appear to require a longer
grace period. Purchases on open account may not be paid until
as much as a month and a half later, since with monthly billing,
the buyer may not receive the bill until a month after delivery.
Given 10 day terms and including time for his check to clear,
it may be another two weeks until payment is actually received.
While a three week or one month grace period is workable, a
six week period would give a failing debtor too much room in
which to maneuver. Thus, some transactions cannot be bridged
by a statutory grace period.
This means that the grace period can only be a supplement
to the other techniques used to protect casually preferred cred-
itors. The courts must continue to view some dealings as con-
tinuing transactions. In general, creditors who are preferred
under circumstances in which they had no reason to believe their
debtors were insolvent should continue to be permitted to keep
their preferences as they now are under section 60 (b) regardless
of whether the transaction is protected by the statutory grace
period.
In the case of liens created by an after-acquired property
clause, however, the lienor's lack of knowledge concerning his
debtor's fortunes seems quite irrelevant. The creditor in such
cases is not a party to the transaction which prefers him. Other
preferred creditors, who accept payment or the grant of a lien,
are parties to the transactions involved. If they could not have
74. A grace period approach which puts in jeopardy liens on bodies
of assets which are quite discontinuous probably will not seriously upset
the expectations of the creditor community. When a floating lien is ac-
cepted, and it is recognized that the body of encumbered assets fluctu-
ates widely and has large discontinuities, the lender recognizes that he
is lending on relatively insecure security. The grace period approach
will somewhat aggravate that risk by holding him to the highest value
in the worst three weeks of the past four months. This value will
occasionally be lower than the value at the date of bankruptcy. But
such a creditor has already taken the risk of more severe injury that
bankruptcy will occur during such a discontinuity and there is no
way that the creditor can receive more than the actual value of the
encumbered assets on the date of bankruptcy. Having then accepted
the rather sizable risk that events will overtake him during a discon-
tinuity, a creditor willing to lend on the security of such assets will
not be much dissuaded by this additional risk. On the other hand,
creditors who look to relatively continuous bodies of assets probably do
not take into account the slight risk that they will be caught by a chance
instant of low value. While the grace period approach cannot help
them if the date of bankruptcy is one of those chance instants, it
will protect them from the impact of section 60 if such an instant oc-
curred during the recent four months.
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connived with the debtor due to lack of reasonable grounds to
know he was distressed, they are permitted to keep their pref-
erences. But the beneficiary of a lien on after-acquired property
has neither accepted the specific lien nor had knowledge of the
particular transaction which created i, so his state of mind at
that instant seems irrelevant to the case. The theory underlying
floating liens is that they have continuity and are to be judged
according to the circumstances existing when the arrangement
was first instituted. If a grace period approach is used to as-
sure sufficient continuity of a lien, the creditor has received
adequate protection and the reasonable cause test of section
60(b) ought not to give further protection.75 The proposed
amendment to section 60 (b) appended to this article so provides.
C. SUMMARY
The grace period approach would remove a number of small
problems inherent in the area of preferences and would provide
sensible administration of secret liens. The proposed new sec-
tion voiding secret transfers would correct the unfortunate de-
cision made in 1910. The new section would also remove the need
for fictitious dating of transfers, a fiction which has certain ana-
lytic beauty but often obscures the real problem. Finally, the new
section would invalidate all transfers withheld from record with-
out regard to the transferee's knowledge of the debtor's solvency,
thereby recognizing that any prolonged failure to record is a
failure to abide by an important legal norm.
On the other hand, practically every amendment to the Bank-
75. Professor Hogan suggests that this problem be dealt with by
recognizing liens on after-acquired property only if the property was
acquired in the ordinary course of business, as is currently provided in
U.C.C. § 9-108. Hogan, supra note 56, at 569-73. Since intentional
feeding arises from transactions beyond the ordinary course of business,
feeding would be voided as a preference. This test would have the
advantage of validating floating liens in businesses whose normal rhy-
thm is too slow to fall within a reasonable statutory grace period. It
might also catch cases of intentional feeding which merely sustained
the value of a lien rather than increasing it. However, determining
what the normal course of business is for an entrepreneur on the brink of
ruin might be an impossible task. It would require trying the issue of
his intent, an issue already found untriable in the preference context.
Professor Hogan attempts to ease the burden of such trials by presump-
tions, depending upon whether the value o:l encumbered property had
increased or not during the four month period; but the trustee would
be duty bound to attempt to rebut such presumptions if he thought it
possible, thereby enmeshing such cases in a search for the debtor's
intent.
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ruptcy Act in this area has had unwanted results, and there is
a good chance that these amendments would have them also.
Certainly the above suggestions, which are the product of only
one mind, are quite likely to be defective in this regard. No
doubt many readers will see unintended results which can be
avoided by rephrasing the proposals. Even then, if history is
any guide, enactment of new sections in this area will probably
present us with some disturbing surprises.
APPENDIX
A. PROPOSED SECTION ON SECRET TRANsFERs
Section 70 (k).76
(1) For the purposes of this subsection, a voidable trans-
fer is a transfer of any property of the debtor (a) which has
not been perfected as defined by the next paragraph of this
subsection, (b) which has remained so unperfected for a period
in excess of 21 days,77 and (c) has remained so unperfected
at a time when the debtor was insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding under this act.
(2) A transfer is perfected when no subsequent ordinary
good faith purchaser from the debtor could obtain rights su-
perior to those of the transferee. Ordinary good faith purchaser
shall not include purchasers who, under applicable law, enjoy
special priorities such as: buyers in the ordinary course of trade
or business, holders in due course of negotiable instruments,
good faith purchasers or investment securities or negotiable doc-
uments of title or chattel paper or other specially favored classes
of purchasers.78
76. This new section has to go somewhere, but if it is put in sec-
tion 60, 67 or 70 it will be unnecessary to amend section 23 (b). Section
60, from which its central idea came, is entitled "preferences," and
tacking it on to the end of that section might prolong the present con-
fusion. Since the new section is related to section 70 (c), I have at-
tached it to section 70.
77. This retains the grace period now found in section 60 (a) (7).
It is somewhat more liberal, giving 21 days whether or not local law
specifies a shorter period. Obviously, this could be changed to specify
21 days or the local law period, whichever is shorter.
78. This section adopts the good faith purchaser test for all trans-
actions, as discussed in note 61 supra. The purchaser test does, how-
ever, have one disadvantage. Consignments, or goods held on sale and
return, are subject to creditors' claims unless perfected. U.C.C. § 2-326
(3). A creditor test, therefore, would properly take care of these cases;
1970]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:737
(3) Any voidable transfer may be avoided by the trustee.
Should any voidable transfer create a lien, security title or
security interest and should the debtor thereafter make or suf-
fer a transfer in satisfaction, either in whole or in part, of the
debt so secured, such subsequent transfer may also be avoided
by the trustee.79
(4) Where any transfer is voidable under this subsection,
the trustee may recover the property or, if it has been con-
verted, its value from any person who has received or converted
such property, except a purchaser with special priority or a good
faith purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's transferee for a
present fair equivalent value: Provided, however, that where
such purchaser or lienor has given less than such value, he shall
nevertheless have a lien upon such property, but only to the
extent of the consideration actually given by him.
(5) Where a transfer voidable under this section results in
a lien, security title or other security interest, the court may
on due notice order such lien, title or interest to be preserved
for the benefit of the estate, in which event the lien, title or
interest shall pass to the trustee.
(6) For the purpose of any recovery or avoidance under
this subsection, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any
state court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had
not intervened and any court of bankruptcy shall have concur-
rent jurisdiction.8 0
B. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE PREFERENCE PRovISIONs
Section 60(a). A preference is a transfer of any property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account
it is not clear that a purchaser test -will. This could be cured by a spe-
cial provision, using a creditor test, for consignments. The section
would appear a bit cumbersome, but it would not cause much trouble in
the administration of the act. Unlike the realty-personalty dichotomy in
section 60(a) (2), which can cause trouble with fixtures, the consign-
ment-nonconsignment dichotomy would not cause trouble in classifica-
tion. An asset is either consigned or it is not.
If consignment were to be properly handled under the act, not only
would a creditor test need to be adopted, but the definition of transfer
in section 1(30) would have to be expanded to include the retention by
a consignor of the consignor's interest, much as it now includes the re-
tention of a vendor's security interest.
79. This sentence permits the trustee to void step transactions.
Once the secret lien is voidable, any subsequent payment or surrender
of the property to the lienor should also be voidable.
80. These last three subsections repeat provisions of section 60 (b).
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of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent not more than four months prior to the filing of a
petition under this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than some other creditor of the same class; provided, no transfer
is a preference if it is given in consideration of value received
no more than 21 days before the transfer.3 1 If any transfer is
given in consideration of value, part of which was received
more than 21 days before the transfer and part of which was
received no more than 21 days before the transfer, the transfer
is a preference only insofar as it was given in consideration of
the value received more than 21 days before the transfer.8 2 For
the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 60 of this
Act, transfers shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
when they became binding between the parties thereto accord-
ing to applicable law.83
(b). Any preference which is a lien created under an after-
acquired property clause may be avoided by the trustee.84 Any
preference other than one created under an after-acquired prop-
erty clause may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor re-
ceiving it or to be benefitted thereby or his agent acting with
reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made,
reasonable cause to believe the debtor is insolvent. Where the
preference is voidable, . . . [etc.].
C. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SEcTioN 3
Section 3 (a). Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist
of his having (1) . . . [etc.] (7) made or suffered a voidabze
transfer as defined in subdivision (k) of section 70 of this act.85
81. This proviso is intended to establish the grace period suggested
in the text accompanying note 73 supra.
82. This sentence is included to deal with cases in which a debt
protected by the grace period and one not so protected are preferred
by the same transfer.
83. This sentence is inserted out of caution to make it absolutely
clear that the fictional dating of transfers which has been embodied in
this section since 1910 is repealed.
84. This sentence and the one following it are intended to withdraw
the element of the transferee's reasonable cause to know of the debtor's
insolvency from all after-acquired lien cases while retaining this ele-
ment in all other cases, as suggested in the text accompanying note 75
supra. The remaining part of the section, as indicated by elipsis marks,
is to be unchanged.
85. Since much of section 3 is to remain unchanged, most of the
unchanged parts are indicated by elipsis marks. The italicized words
are new. They create a new act of bankruptcy but do not create any
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(b). A petition may be filed against a person within four
months after the commission of an act of bankruptcy. Such time
with respect to the third act of bankruptcy shall expire . . .
[etc.] and such time with respect to the second act of bank-
ruptcy shall not expire until four months after the date when
the transfer [became perfected] occurred6 as prescribed in sub-
division (a) of section 60 of this Act, and such time with respect
to the seventh act of bankruptcy shall not expire until four
months after the date when the transfer became perfected as
prescribed in subdivision (k) of section 70 of this Act.81 For the
purposes. . [etc.].
(c) .....
(d). Whenever a person against whom a petition has been
filed alleging the commission of the second, third, [or] fifth, or
seventh act of bankruptcy takes issue with ... the allegation of
his insolvency. . he shall appear in court. . . [etc.].8s
net.: law. If unperfected transactions are no longer condemned by sec-
tion 60, they are no longer examples of the second act of bankruptcy.
An amendment to section 3 is necessary so that they will continue to be
an act of bankruptcy. The second act of bankruptcy could be expanded
to include both preferences and unperfected transfers, but that would
make difficult the wording of the timing provisions of section 3(b).
Indeed, this act of bankruptcy has more in common with the first act in
that the four month period is extended by failure to perfect the transfer.
However, the first act of bankruptcy uses both a purchaser and a creditor
test, with no specific language ruling out the use of hypothetical third
parties with super-priority. Thus, failure to perfect a transfer cannot
be inserted into the first act unless the entire matter of perfection under
sections 3 (a) (1) and 67 (d) is rethought, a task which probably ought to
be done but which is beyond the scope of this article.
86. Since fictitious dating of transfers is to be eliminated from
section 60 (a), the bracketed words should be removed and the italicized
word added. The problem of unperfected transfers will be governed by
the new act of bankruptcy. They will be acts of bankruptcy whether
received as a preference or not.
87. This provision, which parallels the present rule concerning the
second act of bankruptcy, has the effect of delaying the running of the
four month period until perfection.
88. This provides for the same method of trial concerning the issue
of solvency in the new act of bankruptcy as is provided in all others
where the issue is relevant, excepting the first act of bankruptcy which
is specially governed by section 3 (c).
